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ABSTRACT
To design and develop AI-based systems that users and the larger
public can justifiably trust, one needs to understand how machine
learning technologies impact trust. To guide the design and im-
plementation of trusted AI-based systems, this paper provides a
systematic approach to relate considerations about trust from the so-
cial sciences to trustworthiness technologies proposed for AI-based
services and products. We start from the ABI+ (Ability, Benevolence,
Integrity, Predictability) framework augmented with a recently pro-
posed mapping of ABI+ on qualities of technologies that support
trust. We consider four categories of trustworthiness technologies
for machine learning, namely these for Fairness, Explainability, Au-
ditability and Safety (FEAS) and discuss if and how these support
the required qualities. Moreover, trust can be impacted throughout
the life cycle of AI-based systems, and we therefore introduce the
concept of Chain of Trust to discuss trustworthiness technologies
in all stages of the life cycle. In so doing we establish the ways in
which machine learning technologies support trusted AI-based sys-
tems. Finally, FEAS has obvious relations with known frameworks
and therefore we relate FEAS to a variety of international ‘princi-
pled AI’ policy and technology frameworks that have emerged in
recent years.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Applied computing→ Sociology; • Social and professional
topics→ Computing / technology policy; • Security and pri-
vacy→ Human and societal aspects of security and privacy; • Com-
putingmethodologies→Artificial intelligence;Machine learn-
ing.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Growing interest in ethical dimensions of AI and machine learn-
ing has led to the focus on ways of ensuring trustworthiness of
current and future practices (e.g. European Commission 2019, IBM
n.d.). The current emphasis on this area reflects recognition that
maintaining trust in AI may be critical for ensuring acceptance
and successful adoption of AI-driven services and products [67, 81].
This has implications for the many AI-based services and products
that are increasingly entering the market. How trust is established,
maintained or eroded depends on a number of factors including
an individual’s or group’s interaction with others, data, environ-
ments, services, products and factors, which combine to shape an
individual’s perception of trustworthiness or otherwise. Percep-
tions of trustworthiness impact on AI and consequently, influence
a person’s decision and behaviour associated with the service or
product. In this paper, we research the connection between trust
and machine learning technologies in a systematic manner. The
aim is to identify how technologies impact and relate to trust, and,
specifically, identify trust-enabling machine learning technologies.
AI and machine learning approaches are trustworthy if they have
properties that one is justified to place trust in them (see [7] for this
manner of phrasing).
It is important to highlight the difference between studying trust
in AI and studying ethics of AI (and data science). Trustworthy AI
is related to normative statements on the qualities of the technol-
ogy and typically necessitates ethical approaches, while trust is a
response to the technologies developed or the processes through
which they were developed (and may not necessarily - or entirely -
depend on ethical considerations). Ethical considerations behind
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the design or deployment of an AI-based product or service can
impact perceptions of trust, for instance if trust depends on having
confidence in the service not discriminating against the trusting
entity (or in general). However, there may be cases where ethics is
not a consideration for the trusting entity when placing trust in a
service, or, more frequently, if ethics is one of the many concerns
the trusting entity has in mind. In what follows, we will also see
that trust-enhancing machine learning technologies can be related
to various ‘Principled AI’ frameworks, such as Asilomar AI Prin-
ciples introduced in 2017, Montréal Declaration for Responsible
Development of Artificial Intelligence in 2018 and IEEE Ethically
Aligned Design Document.
The aim of this paper is to identify the ways in which (classes of)
machine learning technologiesmight enhance or impact trust, based
on trust frameworks drawn from ethics, social sciences and comput-
ing and algorithm design literature on technological trust qualities.
Figure 1 outlines our approach. At the centre of Figure 1 is the
end product of this paper, trust-enhancing technologies in machine
learning and their classification in technologies for Fairness, Ex-
plainability, Auditability and Safety (FEAS). The downwards arrows
indicate that these technologies are derived from trust frameworks
from social science literature (particularly organisational science).
The upward arrow indicates that the FEAS-classification of tech-
nologies was informed by the various Principled AI frameworks
that shape the ethics and policy discussion in many nations (this is
discussed in Section 4.2).
As indicated in Figure 1, we base our discussion on the widely
accepted ABI (Ability, Benevolence, Integrity) principles underlying
trust, as introduced by Mayer et al.[67] and extended to include
Predictability by Dietz and Den Hartog [29] (a.k.a ABI+). We add
to this a temporal dimension, from initial trust to continuous trust,
as discussed by Siau et al.[59]. This gives us a base to understand
trust in general, and we augment this further by integrating Siau‘s
perspective on trust in technology, which identifies that trust is
impacted by Human, Environmental and Technological qualities
(referred to as the technologies’ HET qualities in what follows). We
will discuss these steps to go from the ABI+ model to HET qualities
of trustworthy technologies in Section 2.
To summarise, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We draw on social science literature, particularly from or-
ganisational science, to apply established principles of trust
to examine the qualities for technologies to support trust
in AI-based systems (primarily based on the ABI and ABI+
framework and the HET qualities).
• We identify how trust can be enhanced in the various stages
of an AI-based system’s life-cycle, specifically the design,
development and deployment stages. We therefore introduce
the concept of an AI Chain of Trust to discuss the various
stages and their interrelations.
• We introduce a FEAS (Fairness, Explainability, Auditability,
Safety) classification of machine learning technologies that
support and enable trust and establish the relation between
these trust-enhancing technologies and the HET qualities.
• We discuss how our technology classification and trustwor-
thy machine learning techniques relate to various Principled
AI framework considered by policy makers and researchers
in ethics and associated topics.
2 TRUST
This section discusses trust frameworks we can use to classify and
identify trustworthy machine learning technologies. It discusses
the top half of the paper contribution provided in Figure 1, the
box with Trust and with Trust in Technology. In Section 2.1 we
introduce the ABI+ framework to describe trust in general, i.e., not
restricted to trust in technology. Section 2.2 reflects on trust in tech-
nology and science, recognising that AI-based services are based
on science and manifest as technologies. The final sections provide
the framework developed by Siau, which includes a discussion on
time-sensitivity of trust (Section 2.4) and recognises three types of
qualities technologies may exhibit that impact trust (Section 2.3).
Trust is discussed across many diverse social science literature
leading to an abundance of definitions and frameworks available
through which to examine the concept. It is a concept which in
everyday conversation is routinely and intuitively used and yet re-
mains challenging to define and study. Andras et al. [5] summarise
some of the ways that trust has been approached across different
disciplines: “In the social world trust is about the expectation of co-
operative, supportive, and non-hostile behaviour. In psychological
terms, trust is the result of cognitive learning from experiences of
trusting behaviour with others. Philosophically, trust is the taking
of risk on the basis of a moral relationship between individuals. In
the context of economics and international relations, trust is based
on calculated incentives for alternative behaviours, conceptualised
through game theory.’ A comprehensive review of literature relat-
ing to trust is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we focus on
established models to examine the nature of trust and discuss how
this relates to technology.
2.1 The ABI+ Framework: Ability, Benevolence,
Integrity and Predictability
The ABI framework introduced by Mayer et al [67] suggested that
the three main attributes which will shape an assessment of the
trustworthiness of a party are: Ability, Benevolence and Integrity.
Themodel discusses the interactional relationship between a trustor
(the entity that trusts) and a trustee (the entity to be trusted). Build-
ing on the work of Mayer et al [67], Dietz and Den Hartog [29]
outline three forms of trust: trust as a belief; a decision and; an
action. While many studies have focused on trust as a belief in
isolation from actions, Dietz and Den Hartog [29] regard the three
forms as being the constituent parts of trust which are most usefully
examined together.
In the ABI model, ability is defined as the perception of: “that
group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party
to have influence within some specific domain”. The specific domain
is crucial as assessments of a party‘s ability will vary according to
particular tasks or contexts. Benevolence is defined as “the extent
to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor”. To
be considered to possess Integrity a trustee must be perceived to
adhere “to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable”. This
requires confidence that the trustee will act in accordance to a set
of principles and that those align with the values of the trustor.
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Trustworthy Machine Learning Technologies (this paper)
Fairness
Technologies
Explainability
Technologies
Auditability
Technologies
Safety
Technologies
Ability IntegrityBenevolence
Trust in Technology (HET technology qualities)
Humane Qualities Technological QualitiesEnvironmental Qualities
Initial Trust Continuous Trust
Trust (ABI and ABI+ frameworks)
Principled AI Frameworks (various governments and other organisations)
Predictability
Figure 1: The contribution of this paper: identification of trust-enhancing Machine Learning technologies based on social
sciences literature and relating these with Principled AI frameworks
Since its inceptionMayer et al. [67]’s framework has been adapted
and expanded to acknowledge the importance of Predictability or
Reliability in shaping perceived trustworthiness. Dietz and Den
Hartog [29] developed the ABI+ model suggesting that the four
key characteristics on which judgements of trustworthiness are
based are: Ability; Benevolence; Integrity and; Predictability. Pre-
dictability will reinforce perceptions of the Ability; Benevolence
and; Integrity of the trustee. Considering the role of Predictability,
draws attention to the importance of trust being sustained overtime
through ongoing relationships.
While each of the attributes are related and may reinforce one
another they are also separable [67]. One party may trust another
even if they perceive one or more of these attributes to be lacking.
As such trust -and trustworthiness- should not be thought of in
binary terms but rather trust exists along a continuum.
As such evaluating one party‘s trust in another is more complex
than a straightforward assessment of whether or not they trust
that party and statements such as “A trusts B” are overly-simplistic,
instead trust is described in statements reflecting the conditional
nature of trust, for example: “A trusts B to do X (or not to do Y),
when Z pertains. . . ” [29, p. 564].
As well as being shaped by judgements of trustworthiness the
act of trusting also depends on a range of external and contextual
factors, personal attributes and traits of the trustor. An individual‘s
predisposition or ideological position will impact on the extent to
which they trust particular individuals/organisations, and these
positions will shape how they receive, interpret and respond to
information about the other party [29].
As the context changes, for example relating to cultural, eco-
nomic, political or personal developments, so levels of trust and
perceptions of trustworthiness also change. Therefore trust is char-
acterised as an ongoing relationship rather than a static concept.
Moreover, trust can be strengthened – or conversely weakened –
through interactions between trustors and trustees: “outcomes of
trusting behaviours will lead to updating of prior perceptions of
the ability, benevolence, and integrity of the trustee” [67, p. 728].
See also Section 2.4 for a discussion of the time- -sensitive nature
of trust.
2.2 Trust in Science and Technology
There is a significant body of literature in the field of Science and
Technology Studies (STS) examining public relationships with sci-
ence and technology, and, in particular, the role of trust in these
relationships. In 2000, the UK House of Lords Science and Technol-
ogy Committee published a landmark statement (which continues
to be widely cited) stating that there was a ‘crisis of trust in sci-
ence’. This reflected wider discourses suggesting that a series of
high-profile scientific controversies and scandals (e.g. BSE, thalido-
mide and the MMR triple vaccine), together with the rapid pace
of scientific progress had resulted in an erosion of public trust in
science [3].
This led to considerable attention directed at ‘improving’ public
trust in science, typically through efforts to increase public under-
standing of science, on the assumption that, where the public is
sceptical or mistrusting, this can be explained by ignorance or lack
of understanding, and as such can be ‘corrected’ through better
dissemination of scientific knowledge or facts [3]). However, such
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approaches are now widely discredited as it is recognised that they
overlook the role of members of the public in actively engaging with
scientific knowledge rather than being “passive recipients of scien-
tific knowledge” [24, p. 206]. Members of the public critically assess,
deconstruct, question and evaluate claims to scientific knowledge
in line with their own ideologies, experiences and the contexts in
which the information is received [45]. This active process shapes
people’s trust as beliefs as well as informing the trust decisions and
actions that are taken.
The public‘s relationship with science and technology is too
sophisticated to be characterised by a simple trust/distrust binary
relationship. Rather, in many cases the public adopts an ambivalent
form of trust – described by Wynne [91–93] as an: as if trust. This
takes account of the public’s “knowingly inevitable and relentlessly
growing dependency upon expert institutions” [93, p. 212].
With regard to AI-based technologies, the dependence on knowl-
edge and behaviours of experts is clear, and trust is increasingly
conditional. This implies that people do not automatically have con-
fidence in particular innovations, scientists or scientific institutions
(but equally lack of absolute trust does not mean that innovations
will be met with public opposition). There can be dissonance be-
tween the trust beliefs held and the decisions and actions taken
based on contextual, personal or organisational factors. In particu-
lar, even where people do not fully trust the technology they may
use a service driven by AI if they feel there is no alternative option.
2.3 Trust Technology Qualities: Humane,
Environmental and Technological
To further understand how technology interfaces with trust, Siau et
al. [81] identify qualities of technologies that relate to trust and the
concepts in the ABI+ framework of Section 2.1. The authors recog-
nise three types of conditions to demonstrate the potential for a
technology to be perceived as trustworthy: humane, environmental
and technological qualities.
Humane Qualities. Humane qualities refer to the actions that at-
tract individuals possessing a risk–taking attitude. The effectiveness
of this quality depends on the personality type, past experiences
and cultural backgrounds of the individuals. This is linked to the
ability of the trustee to satisfy the curiosity of the trustor in testing
a desired task. In other words, if cultural background resonates and
if testing a product or service is feasible, this will typically enhance
trust.
Environmental Qualities. Environmental qualities consider ele-
ments that are enforced by the qualities of the technology provider.
First, it heavily relies on the nature of the task that the technology
handles. The sophistication of the task has a potential to attract
trustworthiness or cause distraction. The pattern of the establish-
ment of trustworthiness differs in various places depending on
the education system, level of their accessibility to novel modern
advancements and subtle inherent cultural backgrounds. Yuki et
al. [95] discussed such cultural impact on the trust establishment
pattern. Institutional factors are another environmental parameter
for trust. Siau et al. [81] defined it as “the impersonal structures that
enable one to act in anticipation of a successful future endeavor”.
They collected two aspects for this concept: the institutional nor-
mality and structural assurance. The first deals with efficiency of
the organisational structure and the later refers to the ability of an
institution to fulfil the promises and its commitments.
Technological Qualities. Finally, technological qualities deter-
mine the capacity of the technology itself to deliver the outcome as
promised. This commitment is multi-dimensional. First, the technol-
ogy needs to yield the results efficiently. Thus, it needs to establish
an agreed performance metric and assure its outcome yields into
the desirable range of the metric. Second, the technology should
define concrete boundaries for their solution. The user (as poten-
tial trustors) of the technology should be provided with enough
information to infer the purpose of the technology and set their
expectations sensibly based on such understanding. Lastly, The
process of the technology outcome is another factor in trustworthi-
ness. The technology should be able to reply to potential queries
about how they concluded such outcome and why it led to the
such performance. This aspect outlines the relation between the
performance and purpose aspects.
2.4 Time-domain: Initial and Continuous Trust
A final element to support our understanding of trustworthy tech-
nologies is understanding trust as it develops over time, as also
discussed in [59]. Highlighting the importance of predictability in
the ABI+ model, the dynamics of relationship between trustor and
trustee is an ongoing process. Usually, it requires initial precon-
ditions to be satisfied, provided through first impressions, which
is referred to as initial trust. After the initial phase, trust levels
may change, for a variety of reasons, and this is referred to as
continuous trust in the literature [81]. Typical examples that may
impact continuous trust in AI-based services and products are data
breaches, privacy leaks or news items on (unethical) business or
other practices.
In what follows we will consider an additional time-sensitive
element for trustworthy AI-based technologies, namely that of the
service and product life cycle, both in terms of moving between
the stages of design, development and deployment, as well as in
terms of the machine learning pipeline, which includes data input,
algorithm selection and output presentation. See the next section,
and particularly Section 3.3.
3 MACHINE LEARNING AND THE CHAIN OF
TRUST
In this section we introduce the concept of a Chain of Trust, which
connects trust considerations in the stages of the machine learning
pipeline and, when considered over time, the AI-based service or
product may iterate through these stages (effectively expending the
chain into a cycle, as illustrated in Figure 2). Before introducing the
Chain of Trust in Section 3.3, we briefly review the basics ofmachine
learning, as well as the notion of a machine learning pipeline.
3.1 Basics of Machine Learning
A machine learning algorithm is basically a function as y = fθ (x)
(with exception of a few algorithms such as nearest–neighbour [4]).
In this equation, fθ represents the function that maps input to the
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output, i.e. the machine learning model. In this function, θ ∈ Θ
denotes a set of values that is tuned for the optimal operation of f . θ
is calculated based on a pre-defined loss function that measures the
similarity or dissimilarity between samples. The input of a model,
x , correspond to a set of features which is a vector of values that
represents to data, a.k.a. dataset. Finally, y represents the output
of the algorithm to fulfil the task that it meant to undergo, i.e.
supervised, unsupervised and reinforcement learning.
In supervised learning, the output y is meant to be an assign-
ment of the input x to a pre-defined label set. Supervised Learning
algorithms are mainly used in object recognition [54], machine
translation [83], filtering spams [32], etc. For example, a fraud de-
tection classifier would assign two labels (fraud or benign) to an
input feature which is derived from a transaction.
Unsupervised Learning methods are used when the input x and
output y are both unlabelled. In these methods, the task is to de-
termine a function fθ that takes x as input and detects a hidden
pattern representation as output,y. The problems that unsupervised
learning tackles include grouped a dataset based on a similarity
metric (a.k.a clustering [48]), projecting data to a reduced dimen-
sion space (e.g. PCA methods [53]) and pre–training algorithms for
the other tasks (i.e. pre–processing methods) [36].
Reinforcement Learning [84] methods maps x to a set of policies
as y. In these techniques, fθ determines an action, an observation
or a reward (y) that should be taken into account when situation x
is observed. Reinforcement learning techniques are concerned with
how an agent, suppose a rescue robot, should behave under certain
circumstances to maximise the chances of fulfilling a purpose.
3.2 Machine Learning Pipeline
Regardless of the task, the use of any machine learning algorithm
implies activities in various stages, called the pipeline. This is de-
picted in Figure 2 through the chain of circles. First, one collects
the data from a source and store the digital representation in a
database (‘Data Collection’ in Figure 2) . Then, such data undergoes
pre-processing methods to extract certain features, as x in the ma-
chine learning equation, labelled ‘Data Preparation’ and ‘Feature
Extraction’, respectively.
When x is ready to be processed for the supposed task, the
features are divided into at least two groups to attain two purposes.
The first group of features (‘Training’ in Figure 2) are used to tune
θ to optimise the output (y) of the function f . The group of features
for this purpose is called the training data. The training process
can be offline or online, depending on how static the training data
is with respect to the life-cycle of a model. The online fashion deals
with dynamic training in which the model re-tunes θ when new
training data arrives. In contrast, in offline mode, the training stage
only operates once on a static training dataset.
The second group of features is used for the purpose of verify-
ing the generalisation of the fθ parameters when the model faces
an unknown parameters when new training data appears in the
process (‘Testing’ in Figure 2). Verification is done by assessing
the efficiency of the performance through some chosen metric. For
example, in classification, a typical accuracy metric is the propor-
tion of the test data that has been mapped to their original label
correctly by fθ . The features and data used at the testing stage are
Trustworthiness
Data
Collection
Data
Preparation
Feature
Extraction
Training Testing
Inference
Figure 2: Various stages in the machine learning pipeline,
motivating the notion of a Chain of Trust.
called test data. When the model passes the verification stage with
a sufficiently good performance, then they are applied in the wild.
This stage is known as ‘Inference’, in which the trained model is
deployed to face unseen data. In this context, θ is fixed and y is
computed for fθ (x) when x is unknown (i.e. not contained in either
test and training datasets).
In a real–world context, a machine learning system is designed
and implemented for a certain use case. Let us consider face recog-
nition as an example of how the pipeline functions. The recognition
system is based on a machine learning algorithm, fθ (x), that dis-
tinguishes facial properties and maps them on a pre–defined set
of authorised people. This is the supervised learning task. Before
the deployment of the system, a large number of facial samples is
collected, selected and prepared for the system. For instance, images
with corrupt or blurred faces may be removed or the lightening
of the images is re-balanced. This is done in the data collection
and data preparation stages of the machine learning pipeline. The
input to the algorithm, x , is a set of features derived from the facial
image samples using image processing techniques. This is the fea-
ture extraction stage. Then, the algorithm is trained (optimising θ )
with a set of pre–labelled facial images from the sample collection,
the training set. After that, in the testing stage, the trained algo-
rithm is tested with another unknown set of facial image samples
verifying the accuracy of its recognition. Finally, in the inference
stage, the trained and tested system is deployed in a real-life setting,
categorising images of ‘new’ faces captured in real–time.
In what follows we group some of the stages in the machine
learning pipeline. The first group of stages concerns data-centric as-
pects, involving data collection methods, pre-processing techniques
and extraction of useful features for the analysis. The second group
of stages is model-centric, the stages in Figure 2 that deal with
the tuning the model to the best performance (‘Training’ stage),
evaluating the trained model for confirmation of the desirable per-
formance (‘Testing’ stage) and deployment of the model for the
real-world application (‘Inference’ stage).
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3.3 Chain of Trust
We are now in a position to introduce the notion of Chain of Trust.
Based on the machine learning pipeline depicted in Figure 2 it be-
comes clear that technologies may impact trust in the resulting
service or product in various stages of the pipeline. For instance, bet-
ter methods to clean the data during ‘Data Preparation’ may avoid
bias in the output of algorithms, which in turn helps to enhance
trust once it becomes visible to users or the public. There are a num-
ber of important dimensions to the Chain of Trust, each of which
demonstrates the importance of continuous trust as discussed in
Section 2.4.
Stages may impact on each other in terms of the level of trust
they are able to propagate. Romei et al. [77] reviewed various cases
studies that led to biased decisions and analysed the causes. There
is an important specific case of this, namely that trust impact may
only manifest itself in later stages or at a later time. For instance,
in the above example of improving the ‘Data Preparation’, this
enhancement will only impact trust by users if it is made visible to
these users. This may for instance be through better results when
using the services, but, possibly more likely, may also only become
visible if news article or long-term statistics are presented to users
that explain that results are, say, less biased and that therefore can
be trusted. However, where trust is established or damaged based
on visible outcomes at later stages the resulting levels of trust will
have implications for trust in all stages of the development of future
technologies.
The second dimension present in the Chain of Trust results
from the fact that a service or product may iterate through the
stages during its lifecycle, possibly multiple times. This occurs,
for instance, when new data is being introduced to improve the
‘Training’, and through this, the ‘Inference’. In this case, effectively
the service cycles through the chain depicted in Figure 2.
A third dimension within the notion of Chain of Trust is the
development of trust through the stages of design, development
and deployment of the AI-based service or product. Trust will be
impacted by technology decisions in all stages of the lifecycle. In the
above examples, wemainly consider the deployment stage, in which
trust is considered from the perspective of a running service or
existing product. Even simply making an AI-based service available
may run the risk of introducing new biases, or exacerbating existing
ones, because changing the way a service is offered may imply it
is less useful or effective for certain groups. For instance, a recent
study demonstrates inherent discrimination in automated mortgage
advising in the FinTech industry [9]. Therefore, to establish trusted
AI-based solutions it will be critical to consider trust from the initial
stages, starting from the design of a new service or product. In so
doing, trust is considered a priori, before it is being deployed, and
does not come as a surprise once the service is running.
A final dimension to consider in the context of the Chain of Trust
is that of accidents, sudden breakdowns of trust or failures. Typical
examples of such trust failures are security breaches that impact
trust, (reports about) data loss of the service or similar services,
or the discovery of bias in the machine learning results that drive
a service. Such accidents can take place through all pipeline and
life cycle stages discussed above and may have severe impact on
the level of trust users place in AI-based systems. However, the
ways in which an organisation responds to such accidents can be
equally, or more, important for determining the impact on trust.
Dietz and Gillespie [30] have shown that scandals or crises which
risk damaging the reputation of an organisation can also act as
catalysts for culture change bringing about and reinforcing new
ethical/trustworthy practice. They are opportunities to forge new
relationships with stakeholders (positive or negative) [40]. Technol-
ogy solutions that continuously monitor and possibly transparently
share data about service bias are trustworthy technologies that may
assist in avoiding or mitigating the impact of trust failures.
The Chain of Trust denotes the stages in which one can and
should consider the trust qualities of machine learning technolo-
gies, both for initial trust and continuous trust. The chain of Trust
also identifies the opportunities to maintain the trustworthiness
of the system given the evolving nature of the relationship be-
tween the system and its users. Finally, the Chain of Trust provides
guidance for experts and the public how and when to evaluate the
trustworthiness of the system in relation to the ABI+ framework,
not only in the final outcome of the system, but also in all the inner
stages that leads to such outcome.
4 TRUST IN AI-BASED SYSTEMS
We now aim to establish the connection between trust in the AI-
based solution and trustworthiness of the underlying technologies.
We first discuss in Section 4.1 various trust related issues one may
encounter in AI-based services and products. We then discuss in
Section 4.2 a variety of existing Principled AI policy and technol-
ogy frameworks that have emerged in recent years. Based on these
frameworks, we will propose in Section 4.3 a technology-inspired
Principled AI variant, namely FEAS Technologies, that is, technolo-
gies for Fairness, Explainability, Auditability and Safety.
4.1 Trust Considerations in Stages of the Chain
of Trust
In this section we discuss trustworthiness aspects in the various
stages identified in the Chain of Trust. We divide the discussion in
data-related concerns (with the focus on data collection, data pre–
processing and feature selection, Section 4.1.1) and model-related
concerns (with the focus on the stages of model training, testing,
and inference, Section 4.1.2).
4.1.1 Data Related Trust Concerns: Data Collection and Pre-Processing
Stages. Data collection involves reading data from various sources
reliably (e.g. sensors to collect environmental data, a smart speaker
listening to audio commands or website that stores session-related
data from the user’s browser, or etc.); secure transmission of the
data from the collection point to a machine for the purpose of stor-
age or online analysis; storing data in server. The pre–processing
stage includes mechanisms to clean the dataset by removing null,
duplicate or noisy data. Usually, pre–processing solutions combines
with the other ones in data–related stages.
One of the main trust concerns in data is in protection against
privacy violations and other forms of illegitimate use of one’s data.
Legislative support (e.g, in Europe via GDPR regulation) has an
important role to play. GDPR is a perfect illustration of several
data-related trust issues. For instance, the collection process should
be transparent and requires explicit consent from users for many
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data uses. Moreover, the subject keeps the right to challenge the
ability to collect data, has control over their collected data and
maintains the “right to be forgotten”. GDPR-type concerns and
solutions provides a basis to identify technologies that enhance
trust.
In general, the perceived intrusive nature of instances of data
collection has convinced common users to be more cautious in the
situations that their data is being collected [22]. This is a threat to
trustworthiness of a service that functions based on collected data,
particularly AI-based services and products.
Technological solutions for trustworthy data collection, pre-
processing as well as storage have been well established. Trust-
worthiness usually relies on factual declaration of the good faith
(benevolence) and abiding to it in action (integrity). The current
trust challenges are therefore less in the development of technol-
ogy solutions than in identifying ways of interacting, working and
regulating aspects that impact trust.
4.1.2 Model-Related Trust Concerns: Feature Extraction, Training,
Testing and Inference Stages. Model-related trust concerns trust
in the working of the models and algorithms. This set of concerns
gets to the heart of trust challenges we phase in a world in which
AI becomes omni-present, fundamentally changing the way people
live their lives. Many of the trust concerns relate to FAT, a fear
that algorithms may harm society, or individuals, because they
are unfair, without accountability, and non-transparent. As for
data (Section 4.1.1) GDPR is useful as an illustration of the issues
important for society. GDPR enforces a requirement to “explain”
results of AI-based solutions to end users, which implies a desire for
more transparent machine learning. GDPR also contains substantial
accountability measures to implement a mechanism to “challenge”
the outcome of AI–based technology.
The question is what the role of technologies in dealing with
model-related trust concerns. At their core, machine learning mod-
els and algorithms are optimised for accuracy of results and effi-
ciency in obtaining these. While the accuracy and speed of results
might be considered to demonstrate basic functionality (ability in
ABI+ terminology, Section 2.1), they do not necessarily satisfy or
align with other trust qualities. In most cases, algorithms are consid-
ered as a “black-box” [68], which implies algorithms can be assessed
only in relation to the outcomes they produce. Assessments of the
benevolence or integrity (again using ABI+ terms) can therefore
only be done in indirect manners, through that of the entity that
develops or applies the AI-based solution. Of course, justifying
such trust is problematic, especially in the time of high profile data
breaches and scandals relating to mishandling or misuse of personal
data (e.g. Facebook, Cambridge Analytica).
In Section 5 we will introduce a number of technologies to en-
hance or impact trust, of two types. The first type is to establish
a mechanism to verify the outcomes of the model. In this case, an
agent would be responsible to function in parallel to the model
and the model outcome are not accessible until the agent and the
model are both satisfied in a pre–defined criteria. In the second
type one endeavours to (re)design a model or choice of algorithms
into something that is inherently more trustworthy. For example,
the design of a fair SVM model refers to embedding a fairness con-
straints into its definition so that the model functions with the
built-in consideration of that notion. This set of approaches we will
discuss in detail in Section 5.
4.2 Principled AI Policy Frameworks
The trust concerns discussed in the previous section are related to
concerns that have been raised widely about the impact on soci-
ety of the proliferation of AI. This has resulted in the emergence
of a large amount of policy frameworks that relate to Principled
AI frameworks, that is, policy frameworks to enhance and reg-
ulate Fairness, Accountability and Transparency of, particularly,
AI-based services and products. Principled AI frameworks are par-
ticularly relevant to trust as well. Therefore, as depicted in Figure 1,
the bottom box, it is opportune to relate Principled AI frameworks
to the trustworthy technology classification we introduce in Sec-
tion 4.3. It is important to note that in this paper we use FEAS to
classify technologies, while many of the Principled AI frameworks
inform policy and do not provide much detail in terms of specifying
or restricting technology implementations to achieve the policy
objectives.
Principled AI frameworks have been introduced by various stake-
holders (technology companies, professional, standardisation, gov-
ernmental and legislator bodies, academic researchers), as illus-
trated by Table 1. These Principled AI frameworks present varying
sets of qualities that AI-based systems should follow to be consid-
ered trustworthy (some Principled AI frameworks (also) apply to
technologies other than AI). In general, these documents present
high–level definitions for the objectives and qualities of the in-
volved science and technology, but do not go into the specifics of
technical implementation guidelines.
There is emerging literature reviewing Principled AI frameworks.
Whittlestone et al. [88] provide a critical analysis of frameworks
for ethical machine learning and highlights a number of challenges,
some of which require attention from a technical perspective. For
instance, frameworks may confuse the interpretation of qualities,
present conflicting definitions and/or qualities may be different
across different documents. Particularly relevant also for the un-
derlying technologies is that the frameworks often fail to realise
dependencies between policy objectives (e.g. addressing discrimi-
nation issues might lead to unexpected privacy leakages). Current
frameworks are focused on privacy, transparency and fairness is-
sues but this needs to be shifted toward understanding such tensions
and re-framing core research questions.
In yet unpublished work, Fjeld et al. [38] analyse currently avail-
able Principled AI frameworks, from industry, governments, general
public, civil societies and academic bodies. Table 1 contains many
of the Principled AI frameworks considered by [38] (see Section
4.3 for an explanation of how we compiled Table 1). Interestingly,
they recognised 47 qualities, categorised them into eight groups,
which are a combination of the qualities identified by Siau [59], i.e.,
humane (promotion of human values, professional responsibility,
human control of technology) and technological qualities (fairness
and non–discrimination, transparency and explainability, safety
and security, accountability, privacy). The authors have available a
graphical demonstration of their findings 1.
1https://ai-hr.cyber.harvard.edu/primp-viz.html
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We note again that most of the frameworks do not focus on trust,
but on ethics, privacy and related concerns. Moreover, the terms
ethical and trustworthy machine learning are at times used inter-
changeably in these frameworks [52]. This would effectively imply
that trustworthiness is achieved through abiding with the ethical
concepts such as human rights or non-discrimination approaches.
However, while ethical considerations are inevitably related to per-
ceptions of trust, ethical machine learning and trustworthymachine
learning are not necessarily the same thing. Specifically, in terms
of ABI+, ethical machine learning would necessarily emphasise the
benevolence aspects of trust, while the other two aspects critical
for trust (ability and integrity) are insufficiently represented.
4.3 FEAS: Fair, Explainable, Auditable and Safe
Technologies
We propose to classify trustworthy technologies in Fair, Explainable,
Auditable and Safe Technologies (FEAS). This is in part motivated
by a desire to align our discussion of trustworthy technologies with
the Principled AI frameworks that are available in the literature, as
discussed in Section 4.2. We stress that the implementation of such
technological solutions in itself will not make the system trusted.
Clearly, trust is only to a limited extend a technology challenge,
which is the reason we provide in this paper the linkage of technolo-
gies with non-technological perspectives on trust. Moreover, even
if one considers only technology, FEAS technologies are not the
only ones that impact trust. For instance, a user–friendly Graphical
User Interface or thoughtful presentation of the results through
meaningful plots may have an impact on the overall trust in the
system, too. However, FEAS technologies represent technological
advances focused specifically on machine-learning and are there-
fore the focus of our attention. The question remains to what extent
the implementation of FEAS technologies, which aim to enhance
trustworthiness, actually also enhance people’s trust. This is an
open problem and should be investigated thoroughly in the future.
We converged on FEAS based on our knowledge and understanding
of the technologies involved, classified in manner we believe will
be comprehensible, illustrative and natural for technologists. Note
that the FEAS technological qualities are in addition to the essential
technological qualities of accuracy and efficiency and performance
of the algorithm(s), without which trustworthiness is not possible.
• Fairness Technologies: technologies focused on detection
or prevention of discrimination and bias in different demo-
graphics [23, 25, 35, 37, 46, 49, 50, 55, 63, 77, 96–98].
• Explainability Technologies: technologies focused on ex-
plaining and interpreting the outcome to the stakeholders (in-
cluding end-users) in a humane manner [6, 17, 19, 33, 41, 42,
60, 62, 69, 76, 86, 89].
• Auditability Technologies: technologies focused on en-
abling third-parties and regulators to supervise, challenge
or monitor the operation of the model(s) [2, 8, 10, 18, 20, 21,
27, 28, 66, 74, 90, 94].
• Safety Technologies: technologies focused on ensuring
the operation of the model as intended in presence of active
or passive malicious attacker [14–16, 56, 71, 73, 78, 79].
4.3.1 FEAS Related to Principled AI. . Table 1 provides the relation-
ship between the FEAS technology classes and the Principled AI
frameworks identified in [38]. We reviewed each of the frameworks
with respect to the FEAS technology classes required to establish
the qualities mentioned in the framework. We mark frameworks
that refer to fairness, explainability, safety and auditability qualities
using the symbols explained in the caption of Table 1.
As one sees immediately from Table 1 all frameworks are re-
lated to FEAS technologies, and would be able to make use, or
even require, FEAS technologies to be available. Note that there is
a considerable difference in the granularity of the discussions in
the Principled AI frameworks compared to that of the computing
literature. Hence, the precise technology needs for each framework
would need deeper investigations, and may not be completely spec-
ified within the existing framework documents. For instance, the
policy frameworks refer to the general existence of discrimination
caused by bias in machine learning algorithms, but in the tech-
nological literature there are at least 21 mathematical definitions
for fairness and a wide range of solutions to prevent/detect bias
in the algorithm. The technology discussion in Section 5 is there-
fore at a much deeper level of detail than that of the Principled AI
frameworks of Table 1.
4.3.2 FEAS Related to Trust Qualities. Table 2 provides the re-
lationship between trust qualities (humane, environmental and
technological, see Section 2.3) and FEAS technologies. Table 2 is
based on the authors’ understanding of the qualities and technolo-
gies, the latter to be discussed deeper in Section 5. Fairness strongly
requires technologies that are strong in humane and environmental
qualities, as does explainability, since their effectiveness strongly de-
pends on individuals and the culture or setting. Safety is dominated
by technological quality associated with security and reliability of
the systems.
5 TRUSTWORTHY MACHINE LEARNING
TECHNOLOGIES
This section discuss technologies for trustworthy machine learning
using the FEAS grouping introduced in the previous section. We
introduce the FEAS classes, discuss challenges and provide some
examples of existing approaches. A full review of technologies is
beyond the scope of this paper.
5.1 Fairness Technologies
This group of technologies is concerned about achieving fair, non-
discriminating outcomes. The ethical aspects of fairness constitute
a structural assurance in the service or product that enhances (or
at least impacts) trust.
Fair machine learning is a difficult challenge. A first challenge
is to identify if how to measure unfairness, typically in terms of
bias or related notions. Narayanan [70] has identified at least 21
definitions of fairness in the literature, which cannot necessarily
all be obtained at the same time. To enhance trust, the metrics used
by machine learning experts needs to relate to how it impacts trust
by individuals and the public, posing an additional challenge.
Various solutions have been proposed to establish a subset of
fairness notions. One approach is to reduce the bias in the dataset,
The relationship between trust in AI and trustworthy machine learning technologies FAT* ’20, January 27–30, 2020, Barcelona, Spain
Table 1: Trustworthy technology classes related to FAT* frameworks. ✗= no mention, ✓=mentioned,✔✔= emphasised
Framework Year Document Owner Entities Country Fairness Explainability Safety Auditability
Top 10 principles of ethical AI 2017 UNI Global Union Ind Switzerland ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Toronto Declaration 2018 Amnesty International Gov, Ind Canada ✔✔ ✓ ✗ ✓
Future of work and Education
For the Digital Age 2018 T20: Think 20 Gov Argentina ✔✔ ✓ ✓ ✓
Universal Guidelines for AI 2018 The public voice coalition Ind Belgium ✔✔ ✓ ✓ ✓
Human Rights in the Age of AI 2018 Access Now Gov, Ind United States ✔✔ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
Preparing for the Future of AI 2016 US national Science,and Technology Council
Gov, Ind,
Acad United States ✓ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
Draft AI R&D Guidelines 2017 Japan Government Gov Japan ✗ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
White Paper on AI Standardization 2018 Standards Administration of China Gov, Ind China ✓ ✗ ✔✔ ✔✔
Statements on AI, Robotics and
‘Autonomous’ Systems 2018
European Group on Ethics in
Science and New Technologies
Gov, Ind,
Acad Belgium ✓ ✓ ✓ ✔✔
For a Meaningful Artificial
Intelligence 2018
Mission assigned by
the French Prime Minister Gov, Ind France ✓ ✓ ✗ ✔✔
AI at the Service of Citizens 2018 Agency for Digital Italy Gov, Ind Italy ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
AI for Europe 2018 European Commission Gov, Ind Belgium ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
AI in the UK 2018 UK House of Lords Gov, Ind United Kingdom ✔✔ ✓ ✓ ✓
AI in Mexico 2018 British Embassy in Mexico City Gov Mexico ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2018
German Federal Ministries
of Education, Economic Affairs,
and Labour and Social Affairs
Gov, Ind Germany ✓ ✓ ✓ ✔✔
Draft Ethics Guidelines for
Trustworthy AI 2018
European High Level Expert
Group on AI Gov, Ind, Civ ✔✔ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
AI Principles and Ethics 2019 Smart Dubai Ind UAE ✔✔ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
Principles to Promote FEAT AI in
the Financial Sector 2019 Monetary Authority of Singapore Gov, Ind Singapore ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
Tenets 2016 Partnership on AI Gov, Ind, Acad United States ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Asilomar AI Principles 2017 Future of Life Institute Ind United States ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
The GNI Principles 2017 Global Network Initiative Gov, Ind United States ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
Montreal Declaration 2018 University of Montreal Gov, Ind, Civ Canada ✔✔ ✔✔ ✔✔ ✓
Ethically Aligned Design 2019 IEEE Ind United States ✓ ✓ ✓ ✔✔
Seeking Ground Rules for AI 2019 New York Times Ind, GeP United States ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
European Ethical Charter on the Use
of AI in Judicial Systems 2018 Council of Europe: CEPEJ Gov France ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
AI Policy Principles 2017 ITI Gov, Ind United States ✓ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
The Ethics of Code 2017 Sage Ind United States ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
Microsoft AI Principles 2018 Microsoft Ind United States ✓ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
AI at Google: Our Principles 2018 Google Ind United States ✓ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
AI Principles of Telef\’onica 2018 Telef\’onica Ind Spain ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
Guiding Principles on Trusted
AI Ethics 2019 Telia Company Ind Sweden ✓ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
Declaration of the Ethical
Principles for AI 2019 IA Latam Ind Chile ✓ ✓ ✔✔ ✓
Table 2: Trustworthy technology classes versus trust qual-
ities [59]. ✗= less important, ✓= important, ✔✔very impor-
tant
Fair Explainable Auditable Safe
Humane Qualities ✔✔ ✔✔ ✓ ✗
Technological Qualities ✓ ✓ ✗ ✔✔
Environmental Qualities ✔✔ ✔✔ ✓ ✓
known as debiasing data. However, it is not sufficient (or even help-
ful) to simply ignore or remove features associated with unfairness,
e.g. gender, ethnics [63]. Luong et al. [65] assigned a decision value
to each data sample and adjusted this value to eliminate discrimina-
tion. Kamishima et al. [50] proposed a model–specific approach by
adding a regulating term for a logistic regression classifier, which
eventually leads to unbiased classification. Other fairness mitiga-
tion solutions focus on the inference stage. They enforce the output
of the model to generate a specific notion of fairness [46].
Žliobaite˙ et al. [98] identify two conditions for non-discriminating
machine learning: data with the same non-protected attributes
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should give the same outcomes, and the ability to distinguish out-
comes should be of the same order as the difference in the non-
protected attribute values. This provides a more generic under-
standing helpful to design fairness technologies. This paper does
not aim to review all techniques but it is clear that many challenges
remain in achieving fair machine learning technologies.
5.2 Explainability Technologies
Explainability refers to relating the operation and outcomes of
the model into understandable terms to a human [51]. In the ma-
chine learning literature, notions of explainability, transparency,
intelligibility,comprehensibility and interpretability are often used
interchangeably [43]. Lipton [60] provides a thorough discussion
on these terms and the differences. He also concludes that explain-
ability increases trust. Doshi-Velez et al. [31] suggested two types
of explainability, namely explainability of an application (e.g. a
physician being able to understand the reasons for a classifier’s
medical diagnostic [75]) and explainability to understand the way
in which a classifier is coming up with its outputs, mainly by using
intelligible models.
There are twomain approaches in explainable solutions. The first
one, known as ex-ante, refers to the use of highly intelligible models
to obtain the desired predictions. The second one, known as ex-
post, refers to the use of a second model to understand the learned
model’s behaviour. In ex–ante approach, an explicit prediction
function analyses feature coefficients to understand their impact
over a decision, decision trees or decision lists [76]).
Ex-post explanations are categorised into local and global ex-
plainers. The ex-post approach uses explain. There is a fast growing
body of literature, including local explainers (e.g., [75, 80] and the
unified framework for local explainers which generalises these and
other existing methods [64]), global explainers (e.g., [57]). There are
many challenges left with respect to explainable machine learning
technologies, including trading off fidelity to the original model
and explainability [69].
5.3 Auditability Technologies
Auditability technologies refer to methods that enable third par-
ties to challenge the operation and outcome of a model. This pro-
vides more transparency to black–box characteristics of machine
learning algorithms. Enabling machine learning lineage provides
insights into how they have operate, which gives a greater degree
of transparency compared to explainability of current processes or
outcomes.
More specifically, auditability in machine learning may involve
assessing the influence of input data in the output of the model.
This ensures predictability, a process that is also referred as “de-
cision provenance” in the literature [82]. Singh et al. [82] argue
that decision provenance have two objectives, it should provide the
history of particular data and it should provide a viewpoint on the
system‘s behaviour and its interactions with its inner components
or outside entities.
Much of the literature around auditability relates to data prove-
nance research in database and cloud concepts [44] and model
provenance approaches [39]. It involves proposals on how to store
provenance data [18, 20, 21, 74, 94], summarisation of provenance
data [2, 28, 66], specific query language for the provenance data [28],
query explainability [8, 10], Natural language processing for prove-
nance data [27, 90] and cryptographic solutions to verify model’s
behaviours without exposing user privacy [72] or revealing model‘s
intellectual properties [87].
5.4 Safety Technologies
Data and the machine learning model could both be the target to ad-
versarial operations. The extent of attacker’s access to the data and
model depends on the intention of the attack and the weaknesses
in the system‘s architecture. The attacker can execute a targeted
attack to harm an individual or perform a indiscriminate attack.
Moreover, the attacker can perform the attack stealthily for the
intention of information gathering or intelligence (a.k.a exploratory
attack) or he/she can actively engage into the functioning of the
system for the purpose of manipulation (a.k.a causative attack).
The security and privacy foundations of a ML model is not dif-
ferent from classical security model of Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability (CIA model [73]). We omit availability, since its
relevance is general, not just or specifically for AI-based services.
Careless preparation of the stored data would leak information to
an attacker [61] but confidentiality can be enhanced in many ways,
for instance through approaches for differential privacy [1, 34], ho-
momorphic encryption [47] or cryptography integrated in machine
learning algorithms [79]. Integrity can be enhanced by either pre-
venting tampering, such as in pre-processing [73], or by discovering
and possibly repairing tampered data [12, 14, 58]. These methods
deal only with data, but it is also relevant to consider integrity
during the execution of the algorithm, e.g., in the training stage
[11, 13, 26, 61, 85].
6 CONCLUSION
This paper established the connection between trust as a notion
within the social sciences, and the set of technologies that are
available for trustworthy machine learning. More specifically, we
related the ABI+ framework and HET technology qualities for trust
with categories of machine learning technologies that enhance
trustworthiness. We identified four categories of technologies that
need to be considered: Fair, Explainable, Auditable and Safe (FEAS)
technologies. These need to be considered in various interrelated
stages of a system life cycle, each stage forming part of a Chain of
Trust. The paper shows a close relationship between technologies to
improve the trustworthiness of AI-based systems and those that are
being pursued in ethical AI and related endeavours. We illustrated
this by mapping of FEAS technologies on concerns in a large set of
international Principled AI policy and technology frameworks.
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